



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

physician:¹ "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct."

"In the fitness of time it may be possible to hold beliefs with intelligence as well as conviction."² That time is not yet. Meanwhile the serious theist is conscious that the reasons he offers for his convictions are unsatisfactory. If he reads "Some Dogmas of Religion" he may be compelled to review his reasons, or to seek better ones. And since "the finding of those reasons is no less an instinct" than the disposition to believe, he will doubtless be grateful to so eminent a critic as Dr. McTaggart for all the help he is able to give him.

DAVID PHILLIPS.

Cardiff.

PROBLEMS AND PERSONS. By Wilfred Ward. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. liv, 378.

Mr. Ward's book is a blending of philosophy and biography, and is well represented by its title. If the atmosphere of the book—to use a phrase of which the author is somewhat fond—is tinged with his definite religious and political convictions, it is refreshing to escape for a moment from the dull gray light of "pure reason," into something more human. It is useful for the student of ethics to be reminded of the great traditions and forces which have done so much to mold the spacious present. For Mr. Ward has something new and intimate to say about several men who did much to determine the course of the nineteenth century; men who embodied its aspirations, beliefs, its scientific advance and historical sense: Tennyson, Newman, Huxley, Renan. Even now they belong to the past.

Mr. Ward finds a parallel between the theory of evolution and the development of dogmatic theology, and so unites the attitude of faith with the acceptance of natural truth as revealed by scientific method. For knowledge itself in all its branches is a case of "organic growth." And so the varied utterances of "the time-spirit of the nineteenth century" are harmonized. Like the instruments of an orchestra which taken severally are harsh or strident, yet blend sweetly in a symphony, so the storm and stress about which the nineteenth century talked so much,

¹ Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," preface.

² Carveth Read, "Metaphysics of Nature."

is almost forgotten as we trace out the meaning of its intellectual life: the critical temper which canvassed and remolded nearly every tradition and institution of the west. After the negative attitude of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth accomplishes the movement of thought by a synthesis in which the critical method replaces the previous dogmatism, whether positive or negative; and it is the author's business to show that a new affirmation of dogma is possible under these conditions.

Mr. Ward will naturally be concerned, therefore, with attempts like that of Mr. Balfour to reinforce authority. In his essay upon "The Foundations of Belief," Mr. Ward defends against Mr. Balfour the bold use of the reason which is necessary, even at the level of sense perception, in the perpetual transcendence of sense impression; and differs only in degree, as we pass from sense-perception to its higher flights. After all, it is a practical reply to those who attack the reason in the name of practice, that the reason is all we have of its kind, and that like other parts of the human outfit, it has served us in the past and will do so in the future.

The first comment upon such a controversy as this would be, I think, that the disputants failed to define their terms adequately. It is quite true to say with Mr. Balfour that mere reason has its serious limitations. In other words, a purely formal logic cannot be applied directly to any complex subject, such as historical investigation. Theory and fact are relative to each other. The reason which in the beginnings of science was purely formal, that is in Greek science, is gradually trained by contact with its subject matter, until it has become almost identified with its subject matter. Thus astronomy is now almost entirely a deductive and formal discipline, and displays thought almost in its purest form. And the self-contradiction which Mr. Balfour discovers in the reason cannot fairly be charged to reason in formal logic, for there the very criterion applied by reason is consistency with itself. Contradiction arises when reason goes beyond itself and is occupied with real problems. And while human reason has solved innumerable contradictions, there will always remain a work for it to do. But not only is reason implicated with its context in the objective universe of thought, it is also implicated with other phases of conscious life. Purpose, pleasure, and desire blend with every movement of reason throughout all its history. Mr. Ward's acquaintance with the Aristotelian and scholastic logic has laid

bare to him the inherent weakness of Mr. Balfour's method. The merit of Mr. Balfour and also of another writer with a similar purpose, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, is that they have begun a discussion of which they have scarcely anticipated the issues. The old demarcation between the theoretical and the practical reason, is passing away. If with Mach we regard each scientific generalization as a practical expedient to the economy of thought, so we are bound to listen to the defenders of ancient institutions when they speak of a similar use of generalizations in the field of practice.

Nor, on the other hand, do I understand the use of Authority by Mr. Ward. The use of the term seems to be derived first of all from its application to the teaching of Jesus, and then to the power which he is stated to have conferred (Matt. x:1) upon his disciples. From this the mediæval church derived the ministry of Peter and his successors. Such, I take it, is the leading meaning of the term Authority as employed by Mr. Ward. And I conceive that a fallacy lurks in the transition from this use to other uses. Hence, when he speaks of "corporate convictions which may act on individuals as authority," I frankly confess that I do not understand. If by authority is meant that we take many statements on hearsay from other persons, the reason is not everywhere dispensed from its task of investigating the origin of its ideas. And although, of course, very few persons are called to this task, these at least will not accept statements on mere hearsay, and, therefore, will to that extent not be influenced by authority. The exact relation between knowledge and authority, is a familiar topic of discussion and will remain so. In the spiritual life it is also one of the most difficult problems. For that reason, it is better sometimes to forget that it exists. "We live by admiration, hope and love."

Perhaps, after all, one may do injustice to the reason. Not only may we forget that reason is implicated in its subject matter: we may forget also that it occurs in individuals. Further we may forget that individuals, in order to be most effective, must be incorporated in a society of some kind or other. The misuse of reason may arise in individuals from a previous excess of credulity which has been unchecked by logical method. This is Plato's view. ("Phædo," 39.) But if with Mr. Balfour, we depreciate reason too much, we paralyze it. And here I should like to quote Mr. Wilfrid Ward's striking account of Mr. Balfour's attitude

towards reason. "An uppish man of real ability is often made far more useful by a certain amount of snubbing, which teaches him the necessity of working in harmony with others, and the value of self-distrust. But the point may be reached at which he becomes disheartened and useless; and so with Mr. Balfour's treatment of Reason." (P. 171.) If Mr. Ward intended by this passage to explain Mr. Chamberlain's relation to the late Premier, he stops just where the theory becomes interesting.

And the corporate use of the reason is instructive, both in its advantages and its defects. So far as reason is concerned with objects abstracted from their human bearings, so far as reason can be separated from its ethical applications, then there seems no limitation to the combined effort of scientific men and thinkers everywhere to understand the world.

But there is something more. To quote Mr. Schiller:¹ "Is it really all that we need demand of our experience that it should be an ordered whole? Do we not demand also that its order should be worthy of our approbation?" That is to say, we pass judgments of value which cannot always be reconciled with judgments of content. And for my part I find a specious paralogism in most attempts to reconcile these two kinds of judgment, as though they could be unified in any process of thought. In some respects the objective system of physical science has solved some of the perplexities of the moral judgment, but it has created fresh ones also. The intellectual repose of most persons, however, is not broken by perplexities such as these: custom and tradition guide them. Or they may even yield a conscious submission to any system of experience in which this conflict is least prominent and least disheartening.

And so lastly we may dwell with interest upon Mr. Ward's last article: "The Life of Mrs. Augustus Craven." This biography, we gather, shows Mrs. Craven as a mind in which political insight and social gifts were joined with a deeply religious nature. Her book, "*Le récit d'une Soeur*," unveils an ideal of family life which can scarcely be surpassed. Without subscribing to special religious formulæ, the student of ethics, and of ethics as applied to education, will do justice to the "grace and dignity of the catholic mind" as displayed in this book. He will try to retain amid the baffling present this delicate perfume of the past.

University College, Nottingham.

FRANK GRANGER.

¹ *Mind*, July, 1905, p. 368.